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Highlights: 
 
 Firms experience significant losses due to misaligned formal contracting. 
 Misalignment matters more for end-product enhancements than for cost reductions. 
 Relational contracting mediates the negative performance effects of misaligned formal 
contracting. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Studies show that failing to align formal contracts with transaction attributes reduces 
relationship performance. However, few studies consider either how the effects of 
misalignment differ across outcome types or the mechanisms through which misalignment 
affects performance. This study examines the effects of misaligned formal contracting on two 
types of outcomes, i.e., end-product enhancements and cost reductions, and on one 
mechanism through which misalignment affects performance, i.e., relational contracting. 
Using survey data from 305 buyer-supplier relationships in the Scandinavian wood industry, 
the findings suggest that (1) misalignment has a significantly stronger negative effect on end-
product enhancements than on cost reductions, and (2) relational contracts mediate the effect 
of misaligned formal contracting on performance. Firms in the sample experience significant 
misalignment-related losses of 10.3% and 5.3% in end-product enhancements and cost 
reductions, respectively. The findings suggest that misalignment is particularly harmful to 
performance outcomes that rely on relational contracting, such as end-product enhancements. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Formal contracting, relational contracting, relational norms, misalignment, transaction cost 
economics, end-product enhancement outcomes, cost reduction outcomes, inter-
organizational relationships 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important decisions facing business-to-business (B2B) marketing managers 
is the use of formal contracts to govern transactional hazards in customer relationships. Such 
contracts are implemented to realize strategic performance outcomes, such as cost reductions 
and improved products and services (Ghosh & John, 1999; 2005). Moreover, transaction cost 
economics (TCE) is a dominant perspective in B2B relationship management. TCE‟s primary 
recommendation is summarized in the discriminating alignment hypothesis: firms should 
“align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in 
their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” 
(Williamson, 1991, p. 79). For B2B marketers and purchasers, this principle encourages high 
performance through consciously engineering formal contracts to account for transactional 
attributes, such as transaction-specific investments and uncertainty. 
 The TCE literature terms the failure to align governance forms with transaction 
attributes as misalignment or misaligned governance (e.g., Mooi & Gilliland, 2013). We use 
the term misalignment1 more narrowly and refer to misaligned formal contracting, which 
means that the parties have chosen a level of formal contracting that deviates from the 
appropriate or expected level of formal contracting under given transaction attributes. Prior 
research strongly supports the hypothesis that misaligned formal contracting erodes 
performance (see Web-appendix A). However, two key areas remain unexplored.  
First, although several studies of the relationship between contracting and performance 
consider multiple types of performance outcomes, few test for effect differences2. Ghosh and 
John (2005) is the only study that tests for performance differences by comparing cost 
                                                 
1 The most common term in the TCE literature is “misalignment” (e.g., Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). Some authors, 
however, use “alignment”, “fit”, and “misfit”. “Misfit” and “misalignment” are synonyms and antonyms of “fit” 
and “alignment”, respectively. We use “misalignment” and “misaligned formal contracting” interchangeably.  
2 To our knowledge, only four studies formally test for effect differences. Ghosh and John (2005) study the 
difference between cost reduction and end-product enhancement outcomes. Bercovitz, Jap, and Nickerson (2006) 
examine the differences between current and expected future performance. Mesquita and Brush (2008) consider 
the differences between production and negotiation efficiencies. Finally, Mooi and Ghosh (2010) examine the 
differences between ex ante contract negotiation costs and ex post transactional problems. 
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reductions and end-product enhancements (i.e., improved end-product utility). These two 
outcome types have different strategic implications: whereas cost reductions are important in 
cost leadership strategies, end-product enhancements are essential in differentiation strategies. 
Hence, we label these relationship performance outcomes strategic performance outcomes. 
Moreover, these two outcome types differ regarding how easily they can be written into 
contracts ex ante and the ease with which they can be enforced in court ex post (Ghosh & John, 
2005). The contracting choices made by buyers and sellers thus have different effects on cost 
reductions compared with end-product enhancements. Ghosh and John (2005) find that 
contract flexibility (i.e., the extent to which the contract leaves certain aspects open for later 
negotiation) has different effects on cost reductions and end-product enhancements depending 
on the level of the buyer‟s asset specificity and the buyer‟s position in the end-product market. 
In this study, we analyze the effects of misaligned formal contracting on cost 
reductions and end-product enhancements. In contrast to Ghosh and John (2005), we study 
misalignment between transaction attributes and the level of formal contracting, which is the 
detail with which explicit contract terms specify the agreement and formalize the parties‟ 
roles and contingency plans (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Macneil, 1980). A detailed contract can 
be either rigid or flexible. The core functions of formal contracting are as follows: (1) to 
facilitate court enforcement, i.e., a more detailed contract specifies a broader area of the 
parties‟ relationship (Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005) and (2) to act as a 
coordination device (e.g., Wuyts, 2007). Hence, the level of detail is often viewed as one of 
the most important aspects of formal contracting (Argyres & Mayer, 2007).  
An often overlooked function of detailed formal contracting is to facilitate the self-
enforcement of relational contracts (Klein, 1996). By contrast, contract flexibility (rigidity) 
presupposes or implies that a relational contract already exists (does not exist) (Carson, 
Madhok, & Wu, 2006). In relational contracting, the parties implicitly or informally agree on 
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the terms of exchange and self-enforce the contractual agreement rather than relying on 
enforcement through the judicial system (Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, 2010). Based on TCE, we 
argue that misaligned formal contracting undermines relational contracts and that more 
extensive use of relational contracting is required to realize end-product enhancements than to 
realize cost reductions. Thus, misalignment should have a stronger negative effect on end-
product enhancement than on cost reduction. By examining these effects empirically, we 
deepen our understanding of the role of formal contracting in realizing these two outcomes 
and shed light on important tradeoffs that firms should consider when designing contracts.  
Second, few empirical studies use mediation tests to examine the mechanisms through 
which misalignment affects performance. Testing mediation hypotheses may provide 
additional support for TCE and its core arguments, thereby increasing our understanding of 
how misalignment affects performance. Although Jap and Ganesan (2000) test for mediation, 
their proposed mediator, supplier commitment, does not mediate the effect of misalignment. 
Therefore, other mediators should be considered. Considering the importance of relational 
contracting to relationship performance (e.g., Bercovitz et al., 2006; Jap & Ganesan, 2000), 
we expect it to act as a key mediator.  
In summary, we hypothesize that the negative effects of misalignment are stronger on 
end-product enhancements than on cost reductions, and that relational contracting mediates 
these effects. Importantly, comparing two different outcomes is a form of moderator analysis 
in which the outcome type is a moderator describing the characteristics of the outcome. 
Outcome types should thus offer insight into the mechanisms through which misalignment 
affects performance (Ghosh & John, 2005). Hence, testing for effect difference complements 
mediation tests when assessing a proposed mechanism, and consistency between the results of 
testing the two hypotheses lends additional confidence to the results.    
In this study, we provide theoretical argumentation for these two hypotheses and 
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report the results from testing them on a sample of 305 buyer-supplier relationships in the 
Scandinavian wood industry. The analysis accounts for the endogeneity of both formal and 
relational contracting, and we discuss the implications of our findings. The Web-appendices 
report more detail regarding the data and methods presented in the paper. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The discriminant alignment hypothesis and its implications: The discriminant alignment 
hypothesis suggests that firms should align formal contracts with transaction attributes. 
Williamson (e.g., 1985) describes three transaction attributes – asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and frequency – and he identifies asset specificity as “the big locomotive to which TCE owes 
much of its predictive content” (1985, p. 56). In addition, the empirical literature suggests that 
performance ambiguity and complexity should be included as transaction attributes (e.g., 
Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). These attributes create exchange hazards that may create temptations 
for opportunistic behavior.  
To „align formal contracts with transaction attributes‟ means two things. First, when a 
relationship is characterized by hazards such as asset specificity, firms should safeguard these 
investments by means of formal contracts. Second, when there are no hazards, firms should 
not use formal contracts. Empirical research typically finds a strong positive association 
between asset specificity and formal contracting, which suggests that firms tend to align asset 
specificity with more detailed formal contracts (e.g., Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). Because firms 
should align governance structures with transaction attributes, firms that fail to do so will 
experience weaker performance (Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 1991; Williamson, 1985).  
Misalignment and the fit-as-matching perspective: A large number of published studies 
examine the performance implications of misaligned governance, of which several have been 
published in marketing journals (Brettel, Engelen, & Müller, 2010; Cannon, Achrol, & 
Gundlach, 2000; Ghosh & John, 2009; 2005; Ghosh, Dutta, & Stremersch, 2006; Jap & 
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Ganesan, 2000; Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). The vast majority of empirical TCE studies support 
the idea that misalignment results in performance reductions, regardless of the context. 
Within the TCE literature, two major perspectives regarding misaligned governance 
dominate: fit-as-moderation and fit-as-matching. The fit-as-moderation perspective 
conceptualizes misaligned governance as interaction terms between governance and 
transaction attributes. Because individual interaction terms in isolation do not offer any 
theoretical meaning, the fit-as-moderation perspective does not distinguish between the 
existence and the effect of misalignment (Venkatraman, 1989). 
In this study, we rely on the fit-as-matching perspective. This perspective 
conceptualizes misaligned governance as a variable in itself, representing a theoretical match 
between one variable and one or several other variables (Venkatraman, 1989). For each 
transaction, there is an optimal or appropriate level of formal contracting, given transaction 
attributes. Both positive and negative deviations  from this level affect performance 
negatively. Therefore, the absolute value of , , defines misalignment as the distance 
from the optimal decision (Venkatraman, 1989). Hence, we define misalignment or 
misaligned formal contracting as the deviation between the chosen level of formal contracting 
and the appropriate or expected level of formal contracting under a given set of transaction 
attributes. Hence, a misaligned formal contract has either too much or too little detail. 
 How do we know if the contract contains too much or too little detail? The most 
common analytical approach to the fit-as-matching perspective is “residual analysis” 
(Venkatraman, 1989, p. 431). Residual analysis has been used in studies of both continuous 
and discrete governance variables in marketing (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010) and related fields (e.g., 
Bercovitz et al., 2006; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). Residual analysis is a two-stage 
procedure in which the first stage involves regressing the governance variable onto 
transaction attributes. The second stage involves regressing performance onto misalignment 
im
im im
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that is measured as the absolute value of the residual  from the first-stage regression.  
The residual analysis rests on three assumptions: (1) competition tends to weed out 
inefficient alignments, and the first-stage estimates can be assumed to reflect efficient 
behavior; (2) firms sometimes make poor contract choices, and the absolute value of the first-
stage residual  can be assumed to reflect mistaken contract choices and thereby captures
; and (3) evolutionary forces do not immediately weed out mistakes despite competition, 
and a significant portion of the population is likely to be misaligned (Web-appendix B offers 
further details about these assumptions and why they should hold in our context).  
An advantage of residual analysis is that we can construct a misalignment variable that 
corresponds to how TCE describes poor alignments. Instead of judging multiple interaction 
terms and their significance levels, we identify variation in the governance choice variable 
due to mistakes and develop a single global index of misalignment. We can thus examine both 
its antecedents and performance consequences (e.g., Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). 
Strategic performance outcomes and relational contracting: As noted in the introduction, 
cost reductions and end-product enhancements differ in several ways. Cost reductions are the 
buyer‟s net gains from lower production and administration costs that are realized through 
cooperation with the supplier, such as improved logistics and/or better fit between the 
supplier‟s components and the buyer‟s production processes (Ghosh & John, 2005). Such 
outcomes are simple to specify in a contract ex ante because they can be quantified. Similarly, 
they are quite easy to measure, verify, and attribute to the efforts and specific investments 
made by each of the parties ex post (Ghosh & John, 2005). 
By contrast, end-product enhancements are the net gains from the improved utility of 
the end-products realized through cooperation with the supplier, such as better differentiation 
of the buyer‟s end products and improved customer perceptions (Ghosh & John, 2005). End-
product enhancements often require complex problem solving through joint search processes 
iˆ
iˆ
im
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across different parts of the value chain. Because search processes are time-consuming, 
parties often suggest and implement actions to improve the end products ex post, making it 
difficult to specify such outcomes contractually ex ante. It is also difficult to relate the parties‟ 
individual actions to end-customer perceptions and sales margins, which makes it difficult to 
measure, verify, and attribute end-product enhancements ex post to the efforts and specific 
investments made by each party ex ante. In addition, end-product markets are often exposed 
to exogenous market changes, making it difficult to rely on the direct effects of contractually 
specified incentives to improve end-products (Ghosh & John, 2005).  
In summary, because end-product enhancements require the parties to undertake ex 
post adaptations to a greater extent than for cost reductions, end-product enhancements are 
more difficult to specify in contracts ex ante and to enforce in court ex post.   
Relational contracting is typically studied as relational norms, which means that the 
parties share mutual expectations and informal rules that motivate certain behaviors, including 
solidarity, flexibility, and information exchanges (Heide & John, 1992; Macneil, 1980). 
Previous studies typically find that such relational contracts positively affect relationship 
performance (e.g., Bercovitz et al., 2006; Jap & Ganesan, 2000). However, because end-
product enhancements are more difficult to specify ex ante and enforce in court ex post, 
realizing end-product enhancements relies on the use of self-enforced relational contracts to a 
greater extent than realizing cost reductions.  
Relational contracting and misalignment: As discussed above, detailed formal 
contracting facilitates (1) court enforcement of the promises specified in the contract; (2) 
coordination; and (importantly) (3) self-enforcement of relational contracts. More detailed 
contracts can lead to improved self-enforcement of relational contracts for two reasons. First, 
formal contracts reduce the incentives for opportunism by facilitating court enforcement of 
the contractible dimensions of the exchange, which will further increase the expected future 
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value of the relationship and motivate the parties to honor implicit promises (Klein, 1996).  
Second, formal contracts shift rents between the parties and create hostages, such as in 
shifting decision control (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2011). Hostages created by a contract 
can be used to equalize the parties‟ relative costs of opportunism. This concept has been 
referred to as dependence balancing (Heide & John, 1988) or hazard equilibration (Masten, 
1988). The notion is to minimize the temptation to act opportunistically by equilibrating the 
potential costs that the parties can inflict upon one another (Williamson, 1983). In summary, 
formal contracts can bolster and ensure the credibility of relational contracts. 
Nonetheless, although formal contracting can support relational contracting, it also has 
the potential to undermine self-enforcement of relational contracts. The concept of 
misalignment captures this double-edged nature of formal contracts. First, if a contract has too 
little detail, we have a negative misalignment. Detailed formal contracts specifying roles and 
contingency plans shift rents, obligations, and authority between the parties, which enables 
safeguarding, coordination, and monitoring for the party at risk (Heide & John, 1988). Thus, a 
negative misalignment implies that the relationship is under-safeguarded, under-coordinated, 
and under-monitored (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). This type of misalignment increases the 
temptation to act opportunistically by means of (1) forced renegotiations, (2) refusals to adapt, 
and (3) performance evasion (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
Second, if a contract has too much detail, we have a positive misalignment. Because 
formal contracts are incomplete, the authority granted to the parties by the contract can itself 
be exploited for opportunistic purposes (Klein, 1996). The parties may, for example, (1) force 
renegotiation by falsely claiming dissatisfaction, suing for trivial deviations, or implying that 
the other party has breached the contract; (2) work to rule; or (3) exploit loopholes and 
ambiguous terms in the contract (Masten, 1988; Wathne & Heide, 2000) . In other words, in 
trying to renegotiate the agreement, one party may make claims based on a literalist 
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understanding of specific terms in the formal contract. However, such behavior is often 
contrary to the original contractual understanding (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Klein, 
2000). Thus, when transactional hazards are low, an overly detailed formal contract represents 
a hazard in itself by making the relationship over-safeguarded, over-coordinated, and over-
monitored (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010), leading to a greater temptation to act opportunistically.  
Therefore, regardless of whether the formal contract is more or less detailed than the 
appropriate level required by given transaction attributes, misalignment implies a failure to 
equilibrate hazards and increases the incentives to act opportunistically. The contract does not 
“equate on the margin the expected costs of opportunistic behavior” (Masten, 1988, p. 191) 
and therefore undermines the credibility of the relational contract.  
Hypotheses:  In the discussion above, we argue as follows: (1) relational contracting 
positively affects performance, (2) relational contracting is required more to realize end-
product enhancements than to realize cost reductions, and (3) misaligned formal contracts 
should negatively affect relational contracts. Combined, these three arguments suggest that 
relational contracting acts as a mediating mechanism in understanding how misalignment 
affects performance and that misalignment should be more detrimental for end-product 
enhancements than for cost reductions. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
H1: Misalignment has a stronger negative effect on end-product enhancements than on cost 
reductions.  
If H1 is supported, it will also provide indirect evidence of the mediating role of 
relational contracting. However, we also explicitly test if relational contracting mediates the 
effect of misalignment on performance and thus hypothesize the following: 
H2: Relational contracting mediates the negative effect of misalignment on relationship 
performance. 
METHODS 
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Research context: We study Scandinavian firms purchasing wood-based raw materials 
and/or components. The Scandinavian wood industry is useful as a context for our study for 
two reasons. First, the wood industry is characterized by substantial variance in transaction 
attributes. On the one hand, wood is heavy and bulky, making transportation costly and 
thereby motivating firms to invest in high-quality logistics systems. Wood may also require 
careful handling with respect to moisture and storage and is heterogeneous, which motivates 
efforts to optimize splitting, sorting, processing, and use. These efforts may require both 
relationship-specific investments and adaptations over time. A variety of firms purchase wood 
products, including processing firms (sawmills and planing mills), resellers (retailers and 
wholesalers), and assemblers (construction firms, joineries, and furniture factories). Hence, 
suppliers often adapt their products and services to their customers‟ unique needs. On the 
other hand, many products in this industry are highly standardized, which may lead to low 
degrees of relationship-specific investments. Assuming that firms want to align governance 
structures with transaction attributes, we should observe substantial variation in the use of 
formal contracts – from simple to highly detailed contracts.  
Second, the industry is fragmented and competitive because of limited scale 
advantages, small firms, and standardized technologies. The competition should weed out 
many inefficient alignments, which leads us to believe that the assumptions underlying the 
residual analysis will hold in this setting. 
Research design and data gathering: We rely on a single key informant in each buying 
organization; each informant was responsible for purchasing and had more than two years of 
purchasing experience. We contacted 2,365 (out of approximately 2,644) business units by 
telephone. We reached 651 people willing to participate from whom we received 305 
complete responses. Web-appendix C provides a detailed description of the research design 
and data gathering.  
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Measures, measure development, and validation: Our empirical models contain (a) 
endogenous variables, (b) instrumental variables (IVs) for formal contracting, (c) IVs for 
relational contracting, and (d) control variables. We use existing measures whenever possible 
and ensured context-relevant item wording by conducting nine in-depth interviews with 
potential informants. We validate the measures using confirmatory factor analysis and find 
that the measures demonstrate satisfactory reliability, unidimensionality, internal and external 
consistency, and convergent validity. Discriminant validity is also satisfactory.  
We assess non-response bias by comparing early and late responders, and find no 
problem. We assess common method bias by including an extra factor in our first-order 
confirmatory factor analysis. We allow this factor to affect all perceptual scale items, but it 
explains only 3.2% of the variance in items, which indicates that common method variance is 
not a major problem. Web-appendix D provides detailed descriptions of all the measures, 
correlations, descriptive statistics, and measure validation.  
Empirical models: The empirical analysis should account for the self-selection and 
endogeneity of formal contracting and relational contracting because it ensures unbiased 
parameter estimates for misalignment and relational contracting. Furthermore, we must 
measure and estimate the effect of misalignment properly. To address these issues, we 
develop a three-step procedure that we explain below. Step 1 estimates the drivers of formal 
contracting and generates the misalignment measure. Step 2 tests H1 by estimating the effects 
of misalignment on the two performance variables while accounting for the self-selection of 
formal contracting. Step 3 tests H2, the mediation hypothesis, while accounting for the 
endogeneity of the mediator (i.e., relational contracting).  
Step 1, generating the misalignment measure: We generate the misalignment measure by 
regressing formal contracting iFC  onto the explanatory variables using heteroskedasticity-
robust ordinary least squares (OLS):  
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0i FC iFC      i FC1 i FC2 i FC3IVFC γ IVRC γ CVγ     1 
where iIVFC is a vector of IVs for formal contracting that includes the following variables: 
relationship complexity, annual purchasing value, and headquarters influence over purchasing. 
iIVRC is a vector of IVs for relational contracting and contains the two variables: the degree 
of internal procurement and knowledge similarity. iCV is a vector of transaction attributes and 
control variables that will be used in all equations and includes the following variables: buyer- 
and supplier-asset specificity and their interactions and quadratics, environmental uncertainty, 
performance ambiguity, buyer-firm size, buyer and supplier experience in sales and marketing, 
and sub-industry dummies. i  is the error term. The γs are parameters.  
For each observation in the sample, we predict the first-stage residual iˆ  and take the 
absolute value to create our measure of misalignment: ˆi iMISALIGNMENT  . 
Step 2, testing H1: When estimating the effects of iMISALIGNMENT  on the performance 
variables, we must account for self-selection. Actors make formal contracting decisions by 
observing components of the gains from formal contracting. However, some of these 
components are likely to be unobserved in our dataset and, by definition, they will be 
captured by the first-stage residual iˆ . iMISALIGNMENT  is therefore not a pure measure of 
inappropriate governance alignments; it may also reflect unobserved components of the effect 
of formal contracting.  
From the literature on the correlated random coefficient model and control function 
estimators for this model, we know that self-selection and unobserved comparative 
advantages can be accounted for by allowing the endogenous variable to interact with a first-
stage residual (e.g., De Blander, 2010; Garen, 1984; Heckman, 1979). Indeed, previous 
studies that take a fit-as-matching perspective have often included an interaction term 
between the choice variable and the first-stage residual, in addition to the misalignment 
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variable (see e.g., Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette, & Dussauge, 2014; Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 
2002; Parmigiani & Holloway, 2011). Hence, we estimate the following equations: 
0 1 ˆi CR CR i CR i CRi i CRiCR MISALIGNMENT FC u         i CR2 i CR3IVRC γ +CVγ  2a 
0 1 ˆi EE EE i EE i EEi i EEiEE MISALIGNMENT FC u         i EE2 i EE3IVRC γ +CVγ  
3a 
where iCR  and iEE  are cost reductions and end-product enhancements, respectively. iˆ  
controls for the endogeneity of formal contracting. To identify the average effects of formal 
contracting, we exclude iIVFC  from entering Equations 2a and 3a. CR  and EE  represent 
the effects of misalignment on cost reductions and end-product enhancements, respectively. 
The  s and  s are parameters; CRiu  and EEiu  are error terms; and CRi  and EEi  are the 
heterogeneous relationship-specific effects of formal contracting. CRi  and EEi  are given by: 
2 ˆCRi CR CR i CRsq iFC               2b 
2 ˆEEi EE EE i EEsq iFC               3b 
where CR and EE  are the main effects of formal contracting on the two performance 
variables. Including iˆ  in Equations 2b and 3b allows for an interaction term between formal 
contracting and the first-stage residual in the effect on performance. Thus, 2CR and 2EE  are 
the parameters for the interaction term between and iˆ  and formal contracting. This 
interaction term controls for the way in which the effect of formal contracting may depend on 
unobserved comparative advantages and how contracting choices due to self-selection 
correlate with these unobserved factors. 
We test H1 by assessing the significance of the difference between CR  and EE : 
EE CR     .           4 
Step 3, testing H2: Estimating the mediated effects of misalignment on the two performance 
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outcomes first involves estimating the effect RC  of misalignment on relational contracting. 
We do so by using a similar estimator as Equation 2a/b. Next, we estimate the effects of 
relational contracting, CR  and EE , on the two performance variables while accounting for 
the endogeneity of relational contracting. We do so by using a simple control function 
estimator. Finally, we estimate the significance of the product terms RC CR   and RC EE  . 
Please see Web-appendix E for further details on Step 3.  
Model evaluation and estimation: We empirically evaluate whether the IVs satisfy the 
exogeneity and relevance conditions and find that the IVs satisfy the exogeneity condition but 
they have somewhat weak relevance. The IVs for relational norms are particularly weak.  
 Two issues are of concern when estimating the models. First, several of the equations 
include generated regressors (e.g., the misalignment variable is generated based on prior 
regressions). Unless corrected for, generated regressors lead to incorrect standard errors for 
the parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). Second, mediated effects tend to be 
asymmetrically distributed rather than normally distributed in finite samples. Because of this 
asymmetry, tests relying on the assumptions of normality provide underpowered tests of 
mediation (Hayes, 2013). Both problems can be addressed using the bootstrap method, and 
we use bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for hypothesis testing. 
Web-appendix E provides a detailed description of model evaluation and estimation.  
RESULTS 
Before testing the hypotheses, we regress formal contracting upon several transaction 
attributes and control variables. Notably, we find that buyer and supplier asset specificity, 
relationship complexity, and annual purchasing value all have significant effects. These 
results are consistent with both TCE theory and previous empirical findings (see Web-
appendix F for more details and results), and we can assume that the absolute value of the 
residuals from this regression represent misaligned formal contracting.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the main results and shows that misalignment negatively affects 
both cost reductions and end-product enhancements. The difference between the two effects is 
significant at the 5% level and supports H1 (-0.41, bootstrap standard errors (BSE) = 0.21, 95% 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval (BCBCI):[-0.92; -0.07]). 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
Turning to H2, misalignment has a significant negative effect on relational contracting, 
and relational contracting has significant positive effects on both cost reductions and end-
product enhancements. The mediated effects of misalignment through relational norms are 
negative and significant at the 1% level for both cost reductions (-0.36, BSE= 0.15, 99% 
BCBCI: [-0.88; -0.11]) and end-product enhancements (-0.48, BSE = 0.19, 99% BCCBCI: [-
1.10; -0.16]), which supports H2.  
We further explore the findings by estimating the expected outcome for each firm in 
the sample if it had avoided misalignment and chosen the recommended level of formal 
contracting, and we calculate the total loss as a percentage over the entire sample. We find 
that misalignment results in a total loss for the firms in the sample of 10.3% in terms of end-
product enhancements and 5.3% in terms of cost reductions. The 95% BCBCI indicates that 
the losses are significant: [-17%; -6%] and [-11%; -1%], respectively. 
Web-appendix F provides a detailed reporting of the analyses and also reports 
robustness checks and post-hoc analyses. The robustness checks show that (a) the models are 
robust to a number of changes in the models, which indicates that the weak IVs are not 
problematic, and (b) misalignment has no significant direct effects on performance when 
controlling for relational contracting, which suggests full mediation. The post-hoc analyses 
show that (a) the two mediated effects are significantly different from one another (p<0.05), 
but not under all model specifications, and (b) purchasing manager sales and marketing 
experience is negatively related to the level of misalignment (p<0.01). The latter finding is 
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consistent with the assumptions underlying the residual analysis and support the notion that 
the absolute value of the first-stage residual captures misalignment.  
DISCUSSION 
Findings and theoretical contribution:  This study provides a deeper understanding of TCE 
by supporting the hypothesis that misaligned formal contracting has a significantly greater 
negative effect on end-product enhancements than on cost reductions and that relational 
contracting mediates these effects.   
Only one previous study compares the effect of misaligned governance with respect to 
these two performance outcomes (Ghosh & John, 2005). Expanding on the insight from 
Ghosh and John (2005), our results suggest how cost reductions and end-product 
enhancements can be achieved and traded off against one another during the contracting 
process by specifying contracts that are more or less detailed. The findings suggest that end-
product enhancements are highly sensitive to misalignment between formal contracting and 
transaction attributes. The effect of misalignment on end-product enhancements is 
significantly stronger than the effect on cost reductions. Hence, firms aiming at realizing end-
product enhancements should pay close attention to misalignment. However, because 
reducing misalignment will result in significantly smaller effects on cost reductions, efforts to 
reduce misalignment are not likely to substantially reduce costs. Attempting to reduce the 
overall level of misalignment at the firm level may even lead to increased costs because 
reducing misalignment can itself be difficult and costly. A number of studies suggest that 
contracting and aligning contracts with transaction attributes is an activity that must be 
learned and that firms can build contracting capabilities (e.g., Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer 
& Argyres, 2004). Consistent with these studies, our post-hoc analysis shows that experience 
in sales and marketing relates negatively to misalignment. However, building contracting 
capabilities by hiring experienced managers, for example, is likely to be costly. Hence, at the 
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firm level, the decision to reduce misalignment may involve a tradeoff between end-product 
enhancements and cost reductions: Reducing misalignment increases revenues, but it may 
simultaneously increase costs.  
However, although efforts to reduce misalignment may lead to only small relationship-
level cost reductions and higher costs at the firm-level, the resulting end-product 
enhancements may lead to longer-term performance benefits. The difficulties and costs 
involved in reducing misalignment and thereby in supporting relational contracts and end-
product enhancements, also represent barriers to imitation. Indeed, recent research suggests 
that relational contracts can be a source of persistent performance differences precisely 
because they are difficult to imitate or replicate (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). In support of 
this argument, prior research finds that gains from revenue-expanding differentiation 
strategies by means of end-product enhancements tend to be greater than those from low-cost 
strategies (e.g., Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). 
We further contribute to the understanding of the misalignment-performance 
relationship by empirically confirming the mediation effects through relational contracting. 
To our knowledge, only one previous study engages in a similar mediation test (Jap & 
Ganesan, 2000), but the proposed mediator in that study, supplier commitment, does not 
mediate the misalignment-performance relationship. We propose an alternative mediator, 
relational contracting, and find that it mediates the performance effects of misalignment. 
Our findings contribute to both marketing research and TCE research more broadly. 
Prior quantitative field studies find that formal contracting either has a positive (e.g., Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002) or nonsignificant (e.g., Lusch & Brown, 1996) effect on relational contracting, 
whereas experimental research (e.g., Bohnet, Frey, & Huck, 2001) tends to suggest negative 
effects (except Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2004). Our findings are more nuanced and 
correspond to economic theory by suggesting that the effects can be both positive and 
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negative (e.g., Klein, 1996; Masten, 1988). We find that each relationship has an optimal level 
of formal contracting that depends on the attributes of the transaction. Increasing the level of 
contract detail to the optimal level has positive effects, whereas using overly detailed 
contracts (relative to this optimal level) has negative effects. Hence, aligning formal contracts 
with transaction attributes supports the credibility of relational contracts, which, in turn, has 
implications for performance.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that formal contracting can be a double-edged 
sword. As a result, firms should play close attention to both the content and length of their 
contracts because formal contracting can both support and undermine relational contracting.  
Managerial implications: The results suggest that managers should be concerned with 
aligning formal contracts to transaction attributes because misalignment leads to significant 
losses in terms of end-product enhancements (10.3% loss) and cost reductions (5.3% loss).  
Previous research based on game-theoretical modeling claims that “a formal 
governance structure should be chosen not only for its own impact but also for how it affects 
the feasible set of relational contracts” (Gibbons, 2005, p. 237). Our results empirically 
support this argument. Managers may be tempted to write contracts that specify a wide range 
of contingencies and outcomes to provide direct ex ante incentives for certain behaviors. 
However, they should avoid writing overly detailed (or overly simplistic) contracts and 
recognize that contracts that are too detailed (or too simplistic) compared to the recommended 
level are likely to undermine relational contracts; in this manner, they can also undermine 
outcomes requiring relational contracting and ex post adaptation, such as end-product 
enhancements.  
 This study further suggests that the fit-as-matching perspective provides managers 
with a viable means of achieving desired outcomes. The fit-as-matching perspective suggests 
that the first step is to estimate the optimal governance choice in each unique situation and 
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then observe the effects of deviating from this optimal choice. Many companies use databases 
to manage their contracts and analyze supplier performance and customer profitability. Such 
data can be used to perform similar statistical analyses as in this study to facilitate learning 
and develop best practices. The analyses can be part of improvement programs, benchmarking 
studies, or even built into contract management software programs.  
Limitations and further research: Improving and extending this study may provide 
directions for future research. Although we assess several assumptions underlying the 
analytical approach, we cannot entirely rule out alternative explanations. In Web-appendix G, 
we discuss threats to the validity of our findings and suggest that they are small.  
 There are ample opportunities for future research to consider other types of 
performance outcomes, other dimensions of relational and formal contracting, and other 
transaction attributes. For example, innovation outcomes rely to a great extent on relational 
contracting (Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, 2009). However, collaborative innovation is often subject 
to particular hazards, such as high technological uncertainty and complexity, high 
performance ambiguity, lack of previous experience with the partner, and knowledge leakage 
hazards. As Gilson et al. (2009) argue, collaborative innovation will often require the parties 
to resolve disputes and engage in joint planning and intensive learning about one another‟s 
motivations and capabilities. Relational contracts facilitating such behavior will thus be 
particularly useful and perhaps more useful than the norms studied here. Likewise, although 
contracts specifying roles and contingency plans are important in collaborative innovation 
projects, other dimensions may be even more important, such as the specification of property 
and decision rights, and the specification of the partners‟ rights and obligations to conduct 
reviews and exchange information (e.g., Carson & John, 2013; Gilson et al., 2009). A critical 
consideration in such cases is how firms should align these formal contract dimensions with 
transaction attributes to support relational contracts that, in turn, facilitate innovation.  
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Figure 1: Results from hypothesis testinga 
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including effects of control variables. We report unstandardized parameter estimates. Hypothesis tests 
are based on asymmetric bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals. *: p-value  < 0.1, **: p-value < 
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Web-appendix A: Overview of earlier contract performance studies 
 
The introduction of the paper refers to previous research on the contract-performance 
relationship. Table WA1 presents the papers that are based on the logic of the discriminating 
alignment hypothesis. A number of other papers have also been published on the contract-
performance relationship, but we present only a few them here (number 18. – 23.) because 
they do not explicitly test implications of the discriminating alignment hypothesis. 
 
 
Table WA1: Overview of earlier contract performance studies (a) 
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Support 
discriminating 
alignment 
hypothesis? 
… formal 
contracting  
(i.e., low vs. high 
level of detail) 
1. Mooi & Gilliland (2013)            Yes 
2. Carson & John (2013)            Yes 
3. Mooi & Ghosh (2010)           Yes 
4. Ghosh & John (2009)            Yes 
5. Anderson & Dekker (2005)           Yes 
… contract 
flexibility  
(e.g., fixed price 
vs. cost plus 
contracts) 
6. Mani, Barua, & Whinston 
(2012) 
      
 
  
 
Yes 
7. Susarla & Barua (2011)            Yes 
8. Carson, Madhok, & Wu 
(2006) 
       
 
  
 
Yes 
9. Ghosh & John (2005)           Yes 
…  relational 
contracting  
10. Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger 
(2008) 
       
 
  
 
Yes 
11. Bercovitz, Jap, & Nickerson 
(2006) 
         
 
Yes 
…  both formal 
and relational 
contracting 
12. Hoetker & Mellewigt (2009)        Partly 
13. Susarla, Barua, & Whinston 
(2009) 
     
 
  
 
Yes 
14. Mesquita & Brush (2008)          Yes 
15. Poppo & Zenger (2002)          Yes 
16. Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach 
(2000) 
      
 
  
 
Yes 
17. Jap & Ganesan (2000)        Partly 
…  both formal 
and relational 
contracting but 
without 
considering 
alignment with 
transaction 
attributes(b) 
18. Poppo & Zhuo (2014)        N.A. 
19. Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 
(2012)     
 
  N.A. 
20. Wuyts & Geyskens (2005)        N.A. 
21. Ferguson, Paulin, and 
Bergeron (2005)     
 
  N.A. 
22. Achrol and Gundlach (1999)        N.A. 
23. Lusch and Brown (1996)        N.A. 
  This study         Yes (a) Grayed-out columns indicate under-researched areas. (b) Studies 18 to 23 consider the effects of governance on 
performance without considering how governance is aligned with transaction attributes. Instead they consider 
direct effects or interactions between governance mechanisms. N.A.=Not applicable.  
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Web-appendix B: Assumptions underlying residual analysis 
 
The paper briefly describes three assumptions underlying residual analysis. We here describe 
these assumptions in more detail and provide evidence that they are viable. In Web-appendix 
C, we further argue that these assumptions will hold in our research setting, the Scandinavian 
wood industry.  
The first assumption is that competition tends to weed out inefficient alignments 
(Anderson, 1996), which is a cornerstone assumption of TCE (Williamson, 1985) and 
supported by several empirical studies (e.g., Nickerson & Silverman, 2003; Susarla & Barua, 
2011). This assumption means that the predicted level of formal contracting (based on first-
stage parameter estimates that correspond to the logic of TCE) provides an estimate of the 
optimal and appropriate degree of formal contracting. Anderson (1988, p. 608) calls this 
prediction ―the industry‘s ‗recommendation‘‖. 
The second assumption is that firms sometimes make poor contract choices. Azoulay 
and Shane (2001) suggest that a lack of knowledge leads contractors, for example, to apply 
erroneous heuristics or to blindly imitate others or follow the advice of others. The research 
by Mayer and colleagues (e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004) 
strongly suggests that contracting choices depend on prior knowledge and experience, which 
implies that firms and individuals with little knowledge and experience are likely to make 
poor contracting choices. This assumption means that mistakes – and thus misalignment – are 
not captured by the first-stage prediction but instead by the absolute value of the first-stage 
residual (Venkatraman, 1989). In other words, the absolute value of the first-stage residual 
should capture im . 
The third assumption is that, despite competition, mistakes are not immediately 
weeded out by evolutionary forces. Nickerson and Silverman (2003) find that evolution 
toward more efficient governance alignments takes time because it can be costly and difficult 
to negotiate governance realignments. This assumption means that a significant portion of the 
population is likely to be misaligned at any given time.  
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Web-appendix C: Additional detail concerning research design and data 
gathering 
 
Research design: Consistent with similar studies of industrial buyer-supplier relationships 
(Buvik & John, 2000; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005), we rely on a single key informant in each 
buying organization (i.e., a business unit that may be part of a larger company/retail chain). 
Although the choice of a single key informant may lead to respondent bias, previous studies 
measuring both sides of the dyad indicate that buyer and supplier responses demonstrate 
significant correlation (e.g., Ghosh & John, 2005; Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003), 
particularly with respect to structural issues, such as formalization (John & Reve, 1982).  
The key informants were responsible for purchasing and had more than two years of 
purchasing experience. To avoid systematic bias, we asked the managers to relate their 
answers to their third most important supplier (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
 
Data gathering: Out of an estimated population of 2,644 business units, we contacted 2,365 
business units by telephone. We reached 651 persons willing to participate, and 562 declined. 
In all, 1,152 business units were either outside the target group or unavailable. We sent the 
participants an e-mail with a link to the questionnaire. We sent two reminder e-mails and 
made one reminder phone call, and we re-contacted informants when necessary to provide 
missing data. We received a total of 305 complete responses.  
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Web-appendix D: Measure development, measures and measure validation 
 
Measure development: Our empirical models contain (1) endogenous variables, (2) 
instrumental variables (IVs) for formal contracting, (3) IVs for relational contracting, and (4) 
control variables. Web-appendix E explains the roles of all the variables using equations.  
We used existing measures whenever possible and ensured context-relevant item 
wording through nine in-depth interviews with potential informants. The interviewees 
completed the questionnaire and provided comments. All interviews were transcribed, and all 
issues encountered by the informants were classified and counted. In addition, we consulted 
industry experts to improve the measures.  
 
Measures: We describe the measures below. All measures are reported in Table WD1. Table 
WD2 reports correlations and descriptive statistics. 
 
Endogenous variables: We measure formal contracting along two dimensions. The first 
dimension, role specification, contains five items measuring the extent to which parties 
specify their different roles. The second dimension, contingency planning, contains three 
items measuring the extent to which parties specify how they will respond to various 
contingencies. These items were previously used by Lusch and Brown (1996) and Wuyts and 
Geyskens (2005).  
Relational contracting is typically studied within the empirical research as relational 
norms, which is defined as the extent to which parties share mutual expectations and informal 
rules that control and coordinate the parties‘ behavior (Heide & John, 1992; Macneil, 1980). 
The relational norms construct is typically understood as a higher-order syndrome consisting 
of several more specific norms. Hence, we measure relational contracting with 11 items 
reflecting the relational norms of solidarity, flexibility, and information exchange. These items 
were previously used by Heide and John (1992), among others.  
We measure end-product enhancements and cost reductions by two five-item scales 
used by Ghosh and John (2005). These scales measure the extent to which cooperation with 
suppliers has increased end-product utility and reduced costs for buyers. We made one 
modification to the end-product enhancements scale. Some of our informants did not like 
formulations such as ―our products and services‖ because they were not directly engaged in 
producing physical products but rather in wholesaling, importing, or retailing. For these types 
of firms, we instead used the formulation ―our product and service offerings‖, which is 
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conceptually similar and easily understood by the informants.  
 
IVs for formal contracting: We measure relationship complexity by means of three items 
previously used by Selnes and Sallis (2003) that indicate the extent to which the relationship 
involves many different units and professions and whether products and services are complex. 
Annual purchasing value is measured in millions of Norwegian kroner, and we apply the 
natural logarithm. We measure headquarter influence through four items indicating the extent 
to which the headquarters controls the business unit‘s purchasing activities. The scale is new. 
 
IVs for relational norms: Knowledge similarity is measured by four items indicating similarity 
in knowledge, education, and training between the purchasing manager responsible for the 
relationship and his or her most important contact person in the supplier organization. The 
scale is new. Internal procurement is measured by a 10-point scale (0% to 90%) indicating 
the share of purchases of the same products from internal suppliers (e.g., subsidiaries). We 
apply the natural logarithm. 
 
Transaction attributes and control variables: Buyer asset specificity is measured by means of 
six items previously used by Heide and John (1992), Buvik and John (2000), and Rokkan, 
Heide, and Wathne (2003). The items assess the extent to which the buyer has made 
relationship-specific investments. Supplier asset specificity is measured by the same six items 
as buyer asset specificity but related to the investments made by the supplier. Environmental 
uncertainty is measured as the perceived volatility of the market environment. The scale 
consists of four items previously used by Buvik and John (2000) and Selnes and Sallis (2003). 
We include main terms, squared terms, and quadratic terms to account for potential non-linear 
relationships. We measure performance ambiguity by means of four items previously used by 
Heide and Miner (1992) and Wuyts and Geyskens (2005). The scale assesses the extent to 
which it is difficult to observe and evaluate supplier performance. We measure purchasing 
manager and supplier contact person experience in sales and marketing using two single-item 
scales. The informant rated his or her agreement with statements suggesting significant 
experience in sales and marketing. These items have previously been used by Korhonen-
Sande (2010). Buyer-firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees. The sub-sector dummies indicate raw-material processing firms (n=42); joinery 
factories, furniture factories and carpentries (n=171); construction firms (n=42); and reselling 
firms (n=50). 
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Measure validation: We initially conduct a confirmatory factor analysis for each construct. 
After removing three items, all scales have sufficient internal consistency. Second, we 
estimate the full measurement model but without second-order constructs. We remove five 
items due to high cross-loadings, and the first-order measurement model has satisfactory fit 
values (χ2(df): 1973.61 (1318), RMSEA: 0.040, SRMR: 0.048, CFI: 0.97, Critical N: 209, and 
Parsimony-normed fit index: 0.79). Third, we apply the second-order factor structure that 
constitutes formal contracting as a set of restrictions on the first-order factor model. Applying 
this factor structure does not reduce the model fit (∆χ2(df)=12.55(16), p=0.71) and increases 
model parsimony (Parsimony-normed fit index: 0.80). Fourth, we similarly apply the second-
order factor structure constituting relational norms. Adding these restrictions significantly 
decreases model fit (∆χ2(df)=58.16(30), p=0.00) but increases model parsimony (Parsimony-
normed fit index: 0.82). Because all other fit indices remain satisfactory (RMSEA: 0.041, 
SRMR: 0.051, CFI: 0.97, Critical N: 210) and because the loadings, average variance 
extracted, and composite reliabilities are all high for the second-order constructs, we consider 
the fit of the second-order model to be acceptable.  
The fit statistics and the measurement diagnostics reported in Table WD2 (see Table 
WD1 for all loadings) demonstrate satisfactory reliability, unidimensionality, internal and 
external consistency, and convergent validity. Discriminant validity is also satisfactory. First, 
all constructs share more variance with their own items than they share with other constructs. 
Second, all correlations are significantly different from unity. We construct composite scores 
for each latent variable by calculating the loading-weighted mean across all items on the 
scale.  
 
Non-response bias and common method bias: Non-response bias does not seem to be a 
problem. Only one item shows a significant difference between early (n=170) and late 
(n=135) responses. We assess common method bias by including an extra factor in our first-
order confirmatory factor analysis. We allow this factor to affect all perceptual scale items but 
restrict it from correlating with other latent variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). Including this factor improves the model-to-data fit (∆χ2(df)=171.02(53), 
p=0.00). However, it explains only 3.2% of the variance of the items, indicating that common 
method bias is not a major problem.  
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Table WD1 Measures and their standardized loadings in the confirmatory factor 
analysis 
Most items are measured on one- to seven-point scales initiated by the statement: ―Indicate the degree to which 
the following statements correspond to how you perceive the actual situation.‖  
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES: 
 
Formal contracting (adapted from Lusch and Brown 1996) 
 
Detailed role specification (λ=0.946) 
1.  Rules (agreements) and regulations have been developed 
for most issues in this relationship. (λ=0.723) 
2.  How to handle day-to-day management of the relationship 
is expressed in a written agreement. *(eliminated owing to 
poor internal consistency) 
3.  We have a detailed contractual agreement with this 
supplier. (λ=0.877) 
4.  Our contract or agreement precisely defines the 
responsibilities of each party. (λ=0.959) 
5.  Our contract or agreement precisely states how each 
party is to perform. (λ=0.918) 
 
Detailed contingency planning (λ=0.904) 
1.  Our contract or agreement precisely states the legal 
remedies for failure to perform. (λ=0.935) 
2.  Our contract or agreement precisely states what will 
happen in the case of events occurring that were not 
planned. (λ=0.906) 
3.  Our contract or agreement precisely states how 
disagreements will be resolved. (λ=0.893) 
 
Relational contracting (adapted from Heide and John, 
1992)  
 
Norm of solidarity (λ=0.975) 
1. The parties are committed to improvements that may 
benefit the relationship as a whole, not only the individual 
parties. (λ=0.680) 
2. Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are 
treated by the parties as joint rather than individual 
responsibilities. *(eliminated owing to poor internal 
consistency) 
3. The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each 
other favors. (λ=0.615) 
4. The relationship between the parties is better described as 
a cooperative effort rather than an ‘‘arms-length 
negotiation.” (λ=0.823) 
 
Norm of flexibility (λ=0.917) 
1. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a 
characteristic of this relationship. (λ=0.755) 
2. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would 
rather work out a new agreement than hold each other to 
the terms in the original agreement. (λ=0.631) 
3. To cope with changing circumstances, the parties expect 
to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing 
relationship. (λ=0.850) 
 
Norm of information exchange (λ=0.851) 
1.  In this relationship, it is expected that any information that 
might help the other party will be provided to them. 
(λ=0.835) 
2.  Exchange of information in this relationship takes place 
frequently and informally, not only according to a 
prescribed agreement. (λ=0.732) 
3.  It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary 
information if it can help the other party. (λ=0.699) 
4.  It is expected that we keep each other informed about 
events or changes that may affect the other party. 
(λ=0.817) 
 
End-product enhancement outcomes (adapted from 
Ghosh and John 2005) 
1.  Cooperation with this supplier has positively contributed to 
boost our sales.(λ=0.831) 
2.  For producers: Cooperation with this supplier contributes 
positively to the customers’ perception of our end-
products and services. 
For resellers: Cooperation with this supplier contributes 
positively to the customers’ perception of our products and 
service offerings. (λ=0.870) 
3.  For producers: The image of our products and services in 
our customers’ eyes has been significantly strengthened 
because of cooperation with this supplier. 
For resellers: The image of our products and service 
offerings in our customers’ eyes has been significantly 
strengthened because of cooperation with this supplier. 
(λ=0.894) 
4.  For producers: Cooperation with this supplier has enabled 
us to make our products and services positively different 
(differentiated) from our competitors. 
For resellers: Cooperation with this supplier has enabled 
us to make our products and service offerings positively 
different (differentiated) from our competitors. (λ=0.689) 
5.  For producers: Cooperation with this supplier has 
positively affected our products regarding product design 
and technical solutions. 
For resellers: Cooperation with this supplier has positively 
affected our total product offering regarding product 
specter and presentation. *( eliminated owing to cross-
loadings)  
 
Cost reduction outcomes (adapted from Ghosh and John 
2005) 
1.  Cooperation with this supplier has enabled us to reduce 
our costs. (λ=0.574) 
2.  Our routines and procedures have over time become 
more effective due to cooperation with this supplier. 
(λ=0.774) 
3.  Coordination of activities between the two parties has over 
time become more effective in this supplier relationship 
than in other supplier relationships. (λ=0.762) 
4.  In this supplier relationship, we have been able to realize 
cost reductions through the implementation of efficient 
practices.(λ=0.834) 
5.  Cooperation with this supplier enables us to respond to 
fluctuations in the market. (λ=0.703) 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR FORMAL 
CONTRACTING: 
 
Relationship complexity (adapted from Selnes and Sallis 
2003) 
1.  The products and services that we exchange are 
generally very complex (entangled/ complicated). 
(λ=0.655) 
2.  There are many operating units involved from both 
organizations in this relationship. (λ=0.812) 
3.  There are many contact points between different 
departments and professions of the two organizations. 
(0.766) 
 
Annual purchasing value  
Natural logarithm of total annual purchases (in million 
Norwegian kroner) through the relationship. 
 
Headquarter influence over purchasing (new scale) 
1. The contractual relationship between our business unit 
and the supplier is governed by the headquarters in the 
chain/company. (λ=0.926) 
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2. The headquarters in the chain/company has responsibility 
for negotiations about prices and terms of trade regarding 
this supplier relationship. (λ=0.978) 
3. The chain or company headquarters decides where we 
can cooperate with this supplier. (λ=0.880) 
4. If we have disagreements with our supplier, it must be 
reported to the chain or company headquarters so that 
they can take care of the issue.* (eliminated owing to 
poor internal consistency). 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING: 
 
Knowledge similarity (new scale) 
1. The contact person and I have similar educational 
backgrounds. (λ=0.756) 
2. The contact person and I have similar formal knowledge. 
(λ=0.904) 
3. The contact person and I have received training in the 
same things. (λ=0.657) 
4. The contact person and I know the same professional 
terms. *(eliminated owing to high cross-loadings) 
 
Internal procurement   
Natural logarithm of (1 + a 10-point scale (0% to 90%) 
indicating the share of purchases of the same products from 
firm-internal supplier (e.g., subsidiaries). 
 
TRANSACTION ATTRIBUTES AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES: 
 
Buyer asset specificity (adapted from Buvik and John 2000; 
Heide and John 1992; and Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) 
1. Our firm has made extensive internal adjustments in order 
to work effectively with this supplier. (λ=0.804) 
2. Our firm has provided special training to employees 
working with this supplier. (λ =0.691) 
3. We have tailored our firm’s operations system (including 
any production system) to the particular products that we 
buy from this supplier. (λ=0.797) 
4. Our firm has made a significant investment in equipment 
and/or plant in order to adapt to the products we receive 
from this supplier. (λ=0.726) 
5. Our firm’s (incoming) logistics system (for example, 
routines, equipment, technology for inventory, 
transportation) has been tailored to meet the requirements 
of working with this supplier. (λ=0.764) 
6. Our firm has, to a great extent, adapted our ordering 
routines and information technology to this supplier. 
(λ=0.649) 
 
Supplier asset specificity (adapted from Buvik and John 
2000; and Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003)  
1.  This supplier has made extensive internal adjustments in 
order to work effectively with our firm. (λ=0.812) 
2.  This supplier has provided special training to employees 
working with our firm. (λ=0.706) 
3.  This supplier has adapted their operations system 
(including any production system) in order to be able to 
deliver to our firm. (λ=0.781) 
4.  This supplier has made significant investments in 
equipment and/or plant in order to adapt to the purchasing 
needs in our firm. (λ=0.757) 
5.  This supplier’s logistics system (for example routines, 
equipment, and technology for inventory, transportation 
and delivery) has been tailored to meet the requirements 
for working with our firm. (λ=0.775) 
6.  This supplier has, to a great extent, adapted their ordering 
and delivery routines to our firm. *(eliminated owing to 
wrong translation into Swedish)  
 
 
Environmental uncertainty (adapted from among others 
Buvik and John 2000; and Selnes and Sallis 2003) 
1.  The demand for our products varies continually. (λ=0.788) 
2.  End user needs and preferences change rapidly in our 
industry. (λ=0.622) 
3.  The market condition of our supplier is very unstable. 
(λ=0.495) 
 
Performance ambiguity (adapted from Heide and Miner 
1992 and Wuyts and Geyskens 2005)  
1.  It is inadequate to evaluate this supplier based only on 
product prices. *(eliminated owing to high cross-loadings) 
2.  It is difficult to determine whether agreed upon quality 
standards and specifications are adhered to.* (eliminated 
owing to high cross-loadings) 
3.  Conducting performance evaluations of this supplier 
requires making sure that they follow approved production 
and quality control procedures. (λ=0.759) 
4.  Evaluating this supplier requires extensive incoming 
inspection. (λ=0.764) 
 
Purchasing manager sales and marketing experience 
(adapted from Korhonen-Sande 2010). 
1. I have a lot of experience in sales and/or marketing.  
 
Supplier representative sales and marketing experience 
(adapted from Korhonen-Sande 2010. The informant was 
asked to evaluate the most important contact person in the 
supplier organization) 
1. The contact person has a lot of experience in sales and/or 
marketing.  
 
Buyer firm size 
Natural logarithm of number of employees in buyer firm 
business unit. 
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Table WD2: Correlation matrix, descriptive statistics, and measurement statistics a 
 
  1 1.1 1.2 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Correlations (based on factor model)                       
1 Formal contracting 0.925   0.060    0.062 0.062 0.060 0.048 0.054 0.064 0.060 0.055 0.059 0.071 0.068 0.060 0.060 0.055  
1.1 Detailed role specification                       
1.2 Detailed contingency planning                       
2 Relational contracting 0.279*   0.916                   
2.1 Norm of solidarity         0.060 0.050 0.065 0.057 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.055 0.072 0.070 0.061 0.060 0.060  
2.2 Norm of flexibility                        
2.3 Norm of information exchange                        
3 
End-product enhancement 
outcomes 
0.138*   0.276*    0.825 0.044 0.065 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.060 0.069 0.070 0.057 0.059 0.059  
4 Cost reduction outcomes 0.231*   0.532*    0.599* 0.735 0.061 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.052 0.049 0.070 0.072 0.061 0.059 0.062  
5 Relationship complexity 0.361*   0.257*    0.198* 0.359* 0.747 0.057 0.064 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.055 0.075 0.066 0.064 0.064 0.061  
6 Annual purchasing value 0.462*   0.276*    0.109† 0.181* 0.352*  0.056 0.060 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.068 0.063 0.057 0.057 0.042  
7 
Headquarter influence over 
purchasing 
0.353*   0.099*    0.149* 0.131* 0.092 0.189* 0.929 0.062 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.068 0.068 0.057 0.058 0.057  
8 Knowledge similarity 0.137*   0.239*    0.187* 0.233* 0.191* 0.177* -0.036 0.779 0.060 0.064 0.065 0.070 0.071 0.060 0.059 0.061  
9 Share of internal procurement 0.125*   -0.041    -0.044 -0.113† 0.070 0.079 0.157* 0.148*  0.061 0.061 0.067 0.067 0.057 0.057 0.057  
10 Buyer asset specificity 0.396*   0.278*    0.322* 0.492* 0.410* 0.285* 0.235* 0.146* 0.002 0.741 0.039 0.072 0.064 0.061 0.061 0.061  
11 Supplier asset specificity 0.323*   0.428*    0.268* 0.550* 0.494* 0.313* 0.188* 0.100 0.001 0.679* 0.767 0.071 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.056  
12 Environmental uncertainty -0.106   0.031    0.172* 0.203* 0.085 0.009 -0.109 0.222* 0.022 0.061 0.099 0.646 0.078 0.067 0.068 0.067  
13 Performance ambiguity 0.205*   0.152*    0.016 0.043 0.392* 0.271* 0.077 0.156* 0.073 0.356* 0.384* 0.123 0.762 0.066 0.067 0.065  
14 
Purchasing manager sales and 
marketing experience 
0.115†   0.104†    0.232* 0.085 0.019 0.102† 0.168* 0.189* 0.103† 0.078 -0.019 0.095 -0.102  0.051 0.056  
15 
Supplier representative sales 
and marketing experience 
0.070   0.137*    0.149* 0.204* 0.005 0.111† 0.104† 0.218* 0.066 0.033 0.038 0.006 -0.057 0.320  0.057  
16 Buyer-firm size 0.323*   0.174*    -0.127* -0.015 0.219* 0.510* 0.130* 0.062 -0.014 0.076 0.287* -0.024 0.177* -0.174* 0.023 
 
 
Correlations (based on scores)                       
17 Misalignment 0.077   -0.009    -0.100† -0.099† -0.022 0.024 0.025 -0.038 0.091 -0.076 -0.016 -0.095† -0.012 -0.076 -0.031 -0.080  
                        
 
 
       
  
     
    
  
 
 
Descriptive statistics        
  
     
    
  
 
 
 Mean 3.671 4.091 3.230 4.890 4.909 4.894 4.863 3.873 3.839 2.524 0.860 1.881 3.240 0.251 2.539 2.651 3.750 3.041 4.095 4.987 3.421 1.078 
 Standard deviation 1.798 1.887 1.907 1.099 1.218 1.226 1.281 1.389 1.234 1.217 1.319 1.644 1.290 0.516 1.287 1.338 1.076 1.363 1.600 1.305 1.343 0.816 
 Skewness 0.141 -0.116 0.440 -0.534 -0.574 -0.666 -0.465 -0.195 -0.072 0.974 0.316 1.930 0.435 2.170 0.819 0.604 0.021 0.511 -0.044 -0.509 0.555 0.868 
 Kurtosis 1.801 1.698 1.979 3.129 3.187 3.173 2.800 2.474 2.446 3.952 3.129 5.460 2.985 6.968 3.047 2.401 2.804 2.627 2.057 2.805 3.217 3.174 
 Minimum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.354 1.321 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -2.303 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.693 0.002 
 Maximum 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 5.298 7.000 7.000 2.303 7.000 6.382 6.740 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.378 3.563 
 
 
       
  
     
    
  
 
 
Measurement diagnostics        
  
     
    
  
 
 
 Composite reliability 0.922 0.927 0.936 0.939 0.752 0.792 0.855 0.894 0.853 0.790 - 0.950 0.820 - 0.879 0.877 0.675 0.735 - - - - 
 Average variance extracted 0.855 0.763 0.831 0.838 0.506 0.563 0.597 0.680 0.540 0.558 - 0.863 0.607 - 0.549 0.589 0.418 0.581 - - - - 
 Lowest st. loading 0.904 0.723 0.893 0.851 0.615 0.631 0.699 0.689 0.574 0.655 - 0.880 0.657 - 0.649 0.706 0.495 0.759 - - - - 
 Highest st. loading  0.946 0.959 0.935 0.975 0.823 0.850 0.835 0.894 0.834 0.812 - 0.978 0.904 - 0.804 0.812 0.788 0.764 - - - - 
a Correlations are positioned to the left of the diagonal, and their standard deviations (in italics) are positioned to the right of the diagonal. The diagonal (in bold) contains the 
square root of average variance extracted for each construct. Correlations that are significantly different from zero are flagged: † p<0.1 and * p<0.05 (two-tailed). All 
correlations are significantly different from unity. Correlations are based on output from the confirmatory measurement model. Descriptive statistics are based on scores 
computed from the actual observations. 
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Web-appendix E: Additional detail concerning the analyses 
 
Graphical illustration of the empirical models: The empirical modeling in this paper is 
complicated, but the various steps are necessary from a statistical point of view. To help the 
reader see the big picture, Figure WE1 complements the equations with a graphical 
illustration of the models. Figure WE1 illustrates most parameters in the equations (to avoid 
clutter, it does not illustrate constants and certain parameters that we list below it). We 
illustrate Step 1 twice, in both parts A and B of Figure WE1, because Step 1 is a necessary 
step before both Step 2 and Step 3.  
Notice from Figure WE1 part A that we illustrate the interaction term between iˆ  and 
formal contracting using an arrow pointing from iˆ  to CRi  and EEi . To avoid clutter, we do 
not illustrate in Figure WE1 the main effects CR and EE  or the quadratic effects in CRsq  
and EEsq in Figure WE1. 
 
Detailed explanation of Step 3: The article contains only a brief explanation of the third step 
in the analysis. A more detailed description is provided below.  
Estimating the mediated effects of misalignment on the two performance outcomes 
first involves estimating the effect of misalignment on relational contracting iRC  using the 
same estimator as used earlier (i.e., same structure as Equations 2a/b and 3a/b): 
 
0 1 ˆi RC RC i RC i RCi i RCiRC MISALIGNMENT FC u         i RC2 i RC3IVRC γ +CVγ  5a 
 
where RC  is the effect of misalignment; the  s and 1RC  are parameters; RCiu  is the error 
term; and RCi  is the heterogeneous relationship-specific effect of formal contracting, which 
is given by 
 
2 ˆRCi RC RC i RCsq iFC               5b 
 
where RC  is the main effect of formal contracting on relational contracting, 2RC
  is the effect 
of the interaction term between iˆ  and formal contracting, and RCsq  is the quadratic effect of  
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Figure WE1: Graphical illustration of the empirical models 
Instrumental variables for 
formal contracting, IVFCi:  
 Relationship complexity 
 Annual purchasing value 
 Headquarter influence 
Instrumental variables for 
relational contracting, IVRCi:  
 Ln of degree of internal 
procurement 
 Knowledge similarity 
Transaction attributes and 
control variables, CVi:  
 Buyer asset specificity (BAS) 
 Supplier asset specificity (SAS) 
 BAS2, SAS2, and BAS*SAS 
 Environmental uncertainty 
 Performance ambiguity 
 Supplier rep. and purchasing 
manager sales and marketing 
experience 
 Sub-industry dummies 
Formal 
contracting, 
FCi 
i
 
ˆ
i iMISALIGNMENT   
Performance 
outcomes, 
CRi and EEi 
Explanations:  
 Black arrows: represent parameters. Thick gray arrows: explanation what we did with the residuals.  
 Black arrows with two parameters or sets of parameters: target the performance variables and represent one for cost 
reductions and one for end-product enhancements. 
 Shaded boxes: represent the heterogeneous effects of formal contracting. The effect is heterogeneous because FCi 
interacts with ˆ
i
  and has a quadratic effect. The interaction between FCi and ˆi  controls for the self-selection of formal 
contracting and reduces bias in the θ’s.  
 To avoid clutter, we do not illustrate the following elements in the figure: constants and the following parameters: 
CR
 and 
EE
 ,  
CRsq
 and 
EEsq
 , and 
RC
 and 
RCsq
 . 
 
Control function: 
iˆ and 
its interaction with formal 
contracting controls for the 
self-selection and 
endogeneity of formal 
contracting. 
A) Steps 1 and 2: testing H1 and H2  
B) Steps 1 and 3: testing H3, mediation hypothesis  
iˆ  
FC1
γ  
FC2
γ  
FC3
γ  
,
CR2 EE2
γ γ
 
,
CR3 EE3
γ γ  
2 2,CR EE 
 
1 1,  CR EE   
,
CRi EEi
   
,
CR EE
   
Instrumental variables for 
formal contracting, IVFCi:  
 Relationship complexity 
 Annual purchasing value 
 Headquarter influence 
Instrumental variables for 
relational contracting, IVRCi:  
 Ln of degree of internal 
procurement 
 Knowledge similarity 
Transaction attributes and 
control variables, CVi:  
 Buyer asset specificity (BAS) 
 Supplier asset specificity (SAS) 
 BAS2, SAS2, and BAS*SAS 
 Environmental uncertainty 
 Performance ambiguity 
 Supplier rep. and purchasing 
manager sales and marketing 
experience 
 Sub-industry dummies 
Formal 
contracting, 
FCi 
i  
ˆ
i iMISALIGNMENT   Relational 
contracting, 
RCi  
Control function: 
iˆ  and 
its interaction with formal 
contracting controls for the 
self-selection and 
endogeneity of formal 
contracting 
iˆ  
FC1
γ  
FC2
γ  
FC3
γ  
RC2
γ  
RC3
γ  
2RC
 
1RC
 
RC

 
Performance 
outcomes, 
CRi and EEi 
RCiu  
ˆ
RCiu  
Control function: We predict 
RCiu  from Equation 5. ˆRCiu  
controls for the endogeneity of 
relational contracting. 
 
Hypothesis2:  
0
RC CR
    and 0
RC EE
        
,
CR3 EE3
γ γ  
RCi
  
,
CR EE
   
,
CR EE
   
CRi
u and 
EEi
u      
CRiu and EEiu      
Hypothesis 1:  
EE CR
   
Predicting i : We predict  i  
based on parameter estimates 
from Equation 1, and use the 
prediction in the next step(s). 
Predicting i : We predict  i  
based on parameter estimates 
from Equation 1, and use the 
prediction in the next step(s). 
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formal contracting (note: to avoid clutter, we do not illustrate RC  and RCsq  in Figure WE1).  
Next, we estimate the effect of relational contracting on the two performance 
variables. The main concern in this estimation is to account for the endogeneity of relational 
contracting. We use a simple control function estimator (Wooldridge, 2010) and include the 
residual ˆRCiu from Equation 5a as a control variable in the performance equations. To identify 
the effect of relational contracting, we use iIVRC  and the square of formal contracting as IVs 
for relational contracting and exclude these IVs from directly affecting performance. To 
reduce multicollinearity, we further exclude iMISALIGNMENT , iˆ , and the interaction 
between formal contracting and iˆ  from directly affecting performance. To the extent that 
these variables affect relational contracting (i.e., RC , 1RC , and 2RC  are significant), they 
are also effectively IVs for relational contracting. Thus, we estimate the following equations: 
 
0 ˆi CR CR i CR RCi CR i CRiCR RC u FC u        i CR3CVγ      6 
 
0 ˆi EE EE i EE RCi EE i EEiEE RC u FC u        i EE3CVγ      7 
 
where the  ‘s are the effects of relational norms, the  s and  s are parameters, the u s are 
error terms, and the  s are the effects of formal contracting (note: to avoid clutter, we do not 
illustrate CR  and EE  in Figure WE1). We are interested in the mediated effects of 
misalignment and test H2 by assessing the significance of the following product terms: 
 
Mediated effect of misalignment on cost reduction outcomes = RC CR      8 
Mediated effect of misalignment on end-product enhancement outcomes = RC EE    9 
 
Evaluating IVs: We empirically evaluate whether the IVs satisfy the exogeneity and 
relevance conditions using the user-written ivreg2-command in Stata 13.1 (Baum, Schaffer, & 
Stillman, 2007; StataCorp, 2013). We find that the IVs as an entity meet the Sargan (1958) 
statistic (p-values >0.29 for all dependent variables) and also meet the difference-in-Sargan 
statistic (p-values >0.13), which indicates that the IVs satisfy the exogeneity condition. 
The partial R-square for the IVs for formal contracting is 0.080, and the F-statistic is 
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8.29, which is slightly lower than Stock and Yogo‘s (2005) cut-off criteria of 9.08, which 
indicates that the IVs are slightly weak. The IVs for relational norms are weak, with a partial 
R-square of 0.061 and an F-statistic of 3.07, which may lead to a finite sample bias in the 
parameter estimates. To control the robustness of the results for changes in IVs, we present 
the results from testing alternative models with a subset of IVs in Web-appendix F.  
 
Estimation: Two issues are of concern when estimating the models. First, Equations 2 to 3 
and 5 to 7 include generated regressors (i.e., iˆ  and ˆRCiu  are generated based on prior 
regressions). Unless corrected for, generated regressors lead to incorrect standard errors for 
the parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). Second, mediated effects tend to be 
asymmetrically distributed rather than normally distributed in finite samples. Because of this 
asymmetry, tests relying on the assumptions of normality provide underpowered tests of 
mediation (Hayes, 2013). 
We address both issues by using the bootstrap method. We follow the instructions 
provided by Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 427-29) for two-step estimators and by Hayes 
(2013) for indirect effects. First, we write a program in Stata 13.1 returning results from 
estimating Equations 1 to 4. Second, we write a program returning results from estimating 
Equations 1 and 5 to 9. We bootstrap both programs using 10,000 replications. We estimate 
asymmetric bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals (90%, 95% and 99%) because they 
account for asymmetries in the distribution of the parameter estimates as well as possible 
finite-sample bias in the parameter estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Hayes, 2013). 
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Web-appendix F: Detailed reporting of the results 
 
In the following, we first report the results from estimating Equation 1. Next, we highlight a 
few other results from estimating Equations 2, 3, and 5 to 7 that are not mentioned in the 
paper itself. Then, we present the robustness checks and finally the post-hoc results. We 
report the hypothesis tests (i.e., estimating  , RC CR  , and RC EE  ) in the paper and do not 
report them here. Table WF1 presents the parameter estimates for Equations 1 to 3, and 5 to 7, 
bootstrap standard errors, and significance levels based on asymmetric bias-corrected 
confidence intervals.  
 
Equation 1: Consistent with prior research, the main effect of buyer asset specificity is 
positive and significant (p<0.05). Supplier asset specificity has a positive but non-significant 
main effect. However, buyer and supplier asset specificity interact significantly in affecting 
formal contracting (p<0.05). Because buyer and supplier asset specificity correlate highly ( rˆ  
=0.68) and because we include their interaction term, we also control for possible 
confounding by including their quadratic terms. The quadratic terms are negative and non-
significant at the 5% level. Due to the interaction and quadratic terms, we conduct simple 
slope analyses for the effects of both buyer and supplier asset specificity, and we find that 
buyer asset specificity has significant positive effects on formal contracting when supplier 
asset specificity has medium-to-high values and vice versa. These results suggest that high 
joint-specific investments motivate detailed formal contracting, which is consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Bercovitz et al., 2006).  
Environmental uncertainty and performance ambiguity are not significantly related to 
formal contracting, which is consistent with the mixed evidence reported in the literature. The 
IVs are significantly related to formal contracting, as expected.  
In summary, the results are consistent with TCE, and we can assume that ˆ i  
represents deviations from TCE predictions and therefore misaligned formal contracting.  
 
Other results: Table WF1 displays other notable results as well. First, formal contracting has 
a positive average effect on relational contracting (Equation 5b) and on both performance 
variables (Equations 2b and 3b). There is a weak significant quadratic effect of formal 
contracting on relational contracting and a strong significant quadratic effect on end-product 
enhancements. There is no quadratic effect on cost reductions. Considering the role of formal 
contracting in supporting relational contracting, the quadratic effects suggest that formal  
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Table WF1: All results from estimating Equation 1 – 3 and 5 – 7a 
 
Equation #: 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 1 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 2a 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 3a 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 5a 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 6 
P
ar
am
et
er
s 7 
Dependent vars.: Formal 
contrac-
ting 
Cost 
reductions 
End-
product 
enhance-
ments 
Relational 
contract-
ing 
Cost 
reductions 
End-
product 
enhance-
ments Explanatory variables: 
Constant 
0FC
  2.048   *** 
(0.651) 0CR
  4.280   ** 
(0.550) 0EE
  4.475   *** 
(0.700) 0RC
  5.000   *** 
(0.548) 0CR
  -0.848    
(1.328) 0EE
  -2.541   ** 
(0.1.723) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relational contracting 
      
  
CR

 
0.983   *** 
(0.293) EE

 
1.295   *** 
(0.387) 
Endogeneity correction for 
relational contracting, ˆ
RCi
u  
      
  
CR

 
-0.625   *** 
(0.301) EE

 
-1.115   *** 
(0.392) 
MISALIGNMENTi ( ˆ
i
  )   
CR
  -0.278   ** 
(0.156) EE
  -0.687   *** 
(0.218) RC
  -0.370   *** 
(0.162) 
    
             
Vector IVFCi 
FC1
γ       
      
Relationship complexity 
 
0.178   ** 
(0.070) 
    
      
Annual purchasing value 
 
0.251   *** 
(0.096) 
    
      
Headquarter influence 
 
0.139   ** 
(0.064) 
    
      
             
Vector IVRCi 
FC2
γ   
CR2
γ   
EE2
γ   
RC2
γ   
    
Knowledge similarity 
 
0.019 
(0.073) 
 
0.091 
(0.062) 
 
0.091 
(0.080) 
 0.111   * 
(0.062) 
    
Ln of degree of internal 
procurement 
 
0.181 
(0.191) 
 
-0.479   *** 
(0.163) 
 
-0.432   ** 
(0.181) 
 -0.318   ** 
(0.158) 
    
             
Vector CVi 
FC3
γ   
CR3
γ   
EE3
γ   
RC3
γ   
CR3
γ   
EE3
γ   
Buyer asset specificity (BAS) 
 
0.245   ** 
(0.105) 
 
0.083 
(0.119) 
 
-0.042 
(0.138) 
 -0.172   * 
(0.107) 
 
0.297   *** 
(0.094) 
 
0.217   * 
(0.128) 
Supplier asset specificity 
(SAS) 
 
0.063 
(0.093) 
 
0.274   *** 
(0.090) 
 
0.185 
(0.111) 
 0.258   ** 
(0.090) 
 
0.026 
(0.119) 
 
-0.135 
(0.162) 
BAS
2 
 
-0.107   * 
(0.055) 
 
0.031 
(0.054) 
 
0.051 
(0.069) 
 0.118   ** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.099   ** 
(0.057) 
 
-0.116   * 
(0.076) 
SAS
2 
 
-0.059 
(0.060) 
 
0.094   ** 
(0.049) 
 
0.021 
(0.062) 
 0.020 
(0.053) 
 
0.061 
(0.044) 
 
-0.028 
(0.061) 
BAS*SAS 
 
0.156   ** 
(0.074) 
 
-0.145   ** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.076 
(0.095) 
 -0.119   * 
(0.079) 
 
0.016 
(0.071) 
 
0.099 
(0.096) 
Environmental uncertainty 
 
-0.122 
(0.078) 
 
0.207   *** 
(0.072) 
 
0.214   *** 
(0.084) 
 0.028 
(0.080) 
 
0.164   *** 
(0.061) 
 
0.173   * 
(0.094) 
Performance ambiguity 
 
0.033 
(0.066) 
 
-0.171   *** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.100 
(0.076) 
 -0.043 
(0.058) 
 
-0.125   ** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.041 
(0.077) 
             
Purchasing manager sales/ 
marketing experience 
 
-0.011 
(0.059) 
 
-0.073 
(0.051) 
 
0.010 
(0.062) 
 0.029 
(0.051) 
 
-0.091   ** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.025 
(0.071) 
Supplier representative sales/ 
marketing experience 
 
-0.029 
(0.068) 
 
0.173   *** 
(0.061) 
 
0.103 
(0.072) 
 0.073 
(0.061) 
 
0.094 
(0.060) 
 
-0.005 
(0.090) 
Buyer-firm size 
 
0.218   ** 
(0.093) 
 
-0.312   *** 
(0.088) 
 
-0.342    *** 
(0.113) 
 -0.121   * 
(0.082) 
 
-0.150   ** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.141   ** 
(0.072) 
Sub-industry dummies 
b
:             
     Construction dummy 
 
1.088   *** 
(0.222) 
 
-0.635   *** 
(0.295) 
 
-0.763    *** 
(0.345) 
 -0.763   *** 
(0.288) 
 
0.231 
(0.200) 
 
0.351   * 
(0.277) 
     Reselling dummy 
 
1.099   *** 
(0.284) 
 
-0.417 
(0.336) 
 
0.252 
(0.411) 
 -0.787   *** 
(0.312) 
 
0.414   ** 
(0.245) 
 
1.372   *** 
(0.322) 
     Processing dummy 
 
1.285   *** 
(0.290) 
 
-0.333 
(0.335) 
 
-0.298 
(0.451) 
 -0.360    
(0.302) 
 
0.033 
(0.208) 
 
0.220 
(0.296) 
             
Endogeneity correction for 
formal contracting,
 
ˆ
i
    
 
 1CR
  -0.427   *** 
(0.180) 1EE
  -0.578   *** 
(0.234) 1RC
  -0.372   *** 
(0.178) 
    
Equation #:    2b  3b  5b     
Relationship-specific effects  
of formal contracting 
   
CRi
   
EEi
   
RCi
  
    
Formal contracting,
i
FC    
CR
  0.467   *** 
(0.169) EE
  0.546   *** 
(0.217) RC
  0.442   *** 
(0.170) CR
  -0.047 
(0.053) EE
  -0.128   ** 
(0.072) 
2
i
FC    CRsq  
-0.015 
(0.035) EEsq
  -0.116   *** (0.049) RCsq  
-0.056   * 
(0.037) 
    
Correction for self-selection, 
ˆ
i i
FC     2CR
 0.062 
(0.069) 2EE
  0.279   *** 
(0.101) 
2RC
  0.177   *** 
(0.075) 
    
R-square  0.433  0.402  0.291  0.252  0.474  0.306 
a Equation 1: heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Equation 2-3 and 5-7: two-sided significance levels based 
on asymmetric bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals: *: p-value<0.1, **: p-value<0.05, ***: p-
value<0.01. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. b The base category includes joinery and furniture 
factories, and carpentries.  
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contracts may sometimes be too detailed in an absolute sense and not just in relation to the  
predicted level. 
Second, the interaction term between iˆ  and formal contracting shows an interesting 
pattern: parties with unexpectedly high levels of formal contracting (i.e., high iˆ ) experience 
stronger positive effects of formal contracting on both relational norms and end-product 
enhancements but not to the same extent on cost reductions. These findings suggest that the 
parties select the level of formal contracting based on their private knowledge of how formal 
contracting should affect relational contracting. In other words, comparative advantage in 
terms of relational contracting seems important for formal contracting choices (Garen, 1984), 
which implies that the parties understand that formal contracting has effects on relational 
contracting. This finding supports the main ideas underlying this paper, that formal 
contracting can both support and undermine relational contracts.  
Third, the residual from Equation 5 ˆRNiu  is significantly and negatively related to both 
performance outcomes. Correcting for the endogeneity of relational contracting is therefore 
preferred because OLS underestimates the effect of relational norms on performance. 
 
Robustness checks: We conduct four robustness checks. First, the main effect of supplier 
asset specificity and its quadratic term on formal contracting are not significant, which may be 
because the buyer reports supplier asset specificity1. We therefore estimate all equations once 
more but without supplier asset specificity or its interaction with buyer asset specificity. 
However, the results still support all three hypotheses ( CR = -0.32, p<0.05; EE = -0.70, 
p<0.01;  = -0.38, p<0.05; RC CR  = -0.36, p<0.01; RC EE  = -0.42, p<0.01).  
Second, because the IVs for relational norms are weak, we estimate a model in which 
we also include iMISALIGNMENT , iˆ , and the interaction between formal contracting and iˆ  
in Equations 6 and 7. However, none of these terms are significant, and the results continue to 
support H3 ( RC CR  = -0.38, p<0.01; RC EE  = -0.47, p<0.01).  
Third, we estimate a model in which we include iMISALIGNMENT  in Equations 6 and 
7. Again, the results do not change, and the direct effects of misalignment are not significant (
RC CR  = -0.35, p<0.01; RC EE  = -0.46, p<0.01; CR = -0.12, p>0.1; EE = -0.15, p>0.1). The 
nonsignificance of these effects suggests that relational contracting fully mediates the effects 
                                                 
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this. 
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of misalignment.  
Fourth, several previous studies examine the use of multiple governance mechanisms 
and how these interact in affecting performance (e.g., Cannon et al., 2000). Such interactions 
may potentially change our results. We therefore also estimate a more complicated model 
(than Equations 6 and 7) that includes interaction terms between formal and relational 
contracting as well as multiple interaction terms between formal and relational contracting 
and the residuals from Equations 1 and 5. These estimations suggest a positive interaction 
term between formal and relational contracting on cost reductions (0.14, p<0.05) but not on 
end-product enhancements (-0.03, p>0.10). However, our main results do not change, as we 
still find significant mediation ( RC CR  = -0.38, p<0.01; RC EE  = -0.53, p<0.01).  
 
Post hoc test of the difference between the mediated effects: The results imply that the 
mediated effect of misalignment through relational norms is stronger on end-product 
enhancements than on cost reductions. We find that the mediated effects are significantly 
different from one another at the 5% level ( RC EE RC CR    = -0.12, p<0.05). However, this 
result is sensitive to model re-specifications. Including one or more of the instrumental 
variables in Equations 6 and 7 leads to more multi-collinearity, wider confidence intervals, 
and an insignificant difference between the effects.  
 
Post-hoc evaluation of the misalignment measure: We cannot evaluate the misalignment 
measure in similar ways as multi-item measures. However, we can evaluate its nomological 
validity, i.e., whether it behaves as it should in relation to other constructs (Campbell, 1960; 
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In particular, we can examine the antecedents to misalignment. 
We have data on purchasing manager and supplier representative experience in sales and 
marketing. Therefore, we test whether purchasing manager and supplier representative sales 
and marketing experience reduces misalignment. 
 We first regress iMISALIGNMENT  
onto iIVRC , iCV , iˆ , iFC  and ˆi iFC  , except for 
the two measures of sales and marketing experience (originally part of iCV ). Only ˆi iFC   has 
a significant effect. Next, we predict the residual from this regression ˆ ˆiˆ i ie    , which 
forms a measure of misalignment free of variance related to the unobserved comparative 
advantages captured by ˆi iFC  . Finally, we regress iˆe  against the two experience variables. 
We find that purchasing manager experience reduces misalignment at the 1% level (estimate 
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= -0.033, p<0.01). However, supplier representative experience has no significant effect even 
at the 10% level, most likely because of high correlation with purchasing manager experience 
( rˆ =0.32). If we exclude purchasing manager experience, supplier representative experience 
significantly reduces misalignment at the 5% level (est.=-0.033, p<0.05). These results 
provide additional confidence that iMISALIGNMENT  captures misalignment.  
Note that we obtain substantially the same results if we include sales and marketing 
experience in the first equation instead of using the two-step procedure (purchasing manager 
sales and marketing experience: -0.045, p<0.05, and supplier representative sales and 
marketing experience not significant).  
Web-appendices  Web-appendix F 
20 
 
Web-appendix G: Limitations of the analytical approach 
 
The analytical approach rests on the assumptions described in Web-appendix B. A critical 
question concerns whether these assumptions hold true or not.  
One threat to the validity of the misalignment measure is self-selection based on 
unobserved variables. Unobserved variables that affect the parties‘ motivation to make a 
certain contracting decision will be reflected in the first-stage residual i  and therefore also in 
the misalignment measure. We account for this possibility by means of a control function 
approach with an interaction term between i  and formal contracting. This approach relies on 
the validity of the instrumental variables. Although our empirical assessment suggests that 
these instrumental variables are exogenous, we are still not able to exclude the risk that none 
of these are exogenous because all exogeneity tests rely on at least one of the instrumental 
variables being exogenous (i.e., testing for exogeneity when in fact none of the instrumental 
variables are exogenous may erroneously suggest exogeneity).  
 Another threat to the validity of the findings is that deviations from the expected level 
of formal contracting result from unobserved factors that have an inverted U- or V-shape 
relationship with relational contracting or performance, instead of resulting from mistaken 
governance choices. Our study shares this threat with all other studies that rely on residual 
analysis. However, we regard this threat as minor for three reasons. First, we do not know of 
any obvious unobserved variables that might have both a linear relationship with formal 
contracting and an inverted U- or V-shaped relationship with relational contracting or 
performance. Second, if such a variable biases the results, it should have a substantial effect 
on formal contracting. The inverted U- or V-shaped effect on relational contracting or 
performance should also be strong. Third, we find that two quite simple measures of sales and 
marketing experience are negatively related to the misalignment measure, which suggests that 
at least part of the variance in the misalignment variable is attributable to mistaken 
governance choices.  
In summary, the results of this study rely on the assumption that deviations from the 
expected level of formal contracting result either from mistaken governance choices or from 
the actors‘ self-selection based on observing variables that are unobserved to us but that also 
have linear relationships with the dependent variables. These assumptions are realistic, 
although we cannot entirely rule out alternative explanations.  
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